Farewell to Kuhn

Thomas S. Kuhn, probably the most influential philosopher and historian of science in the second half of the century, died in the August of 1996. This presents Replika another somber opportunity to continue the set of articles devoted to the major figures of the field (Feyerabend — 1994, Popper — 1995, Lakatos — 1996). The first three papers in this thematic section focuses on Kuhn’s famous incommensurability thesis. Gábor Forrai argues against the strong version of the thesis most readers have associated with Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Márta Fehér explores Kuhn’s more developed, later thoughts on the issue, while János Laki examines the feasibility of the thesis in light of more than thirty years of discussion. Zoltán Jakab analyzes the central concept in Kuhn’s philosophy of science, “paradigm”, from a psychologist’s point of view. Imre Hronszky and Katalin Martinás discuss the applicability of Kuhn’s paradigm concept to the history of technology and thermodynamics, respectively. In the last article of our selection, Vera Békés describes the present difficult relationship between the disciplines of history of science and philosophy of science, and proposes the outlines of a comparative history of science.